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Abstract
It is natural to wonder about contract law’s relationship to the morality of
promises and agreements. This Chapter distinguishes two ways to conceive of
that relationship. First, parties’ agreement-based moral obligations might figure
into the explanation of contract law—into an account of its functions or
justifications. Contract law might serve to enforce parties’ first-order
performance obligations, to enforce second-order remedial obligations, to
support the culture of making and keeping agreements more generally, or at
least to do no harm to that culture or to people’s ability to act morally. Second,
contract can be understood as the legal analog to promise. Both contract and
promise enable people to undertake new obligations to one another when they
wish. Each is a type of normative power, the one legal, the other moral. The
Chapter concludes by arguing that these two ways of thinking about contract
law are not mutually exclusive. Contract law both imposes on parties to
exchange agreements a legal obligation to perform for reasons independent of
the parties’ possible contractual intent, and confers on them the power to
undertake that legal obligation when they so intend because they so intend.

Introduction
Private law concerns legal obligations persons owe one another. It is
therefore natural to ask about private law’s relationship to the moral sphere,
which includes many similarly structured obligations. When it comes to contract
law, the obvious place to look is the moral obligations that attach to promises
and agreements.
This chapter examines the relationship between contract law and
morality. Part One describes the conceptions of contract, promise, agreement,
and voluntary obligation used in the chapter. Part Two discusses ways in which
parties’ moral obligations might explain their contractual ones. Part Three
describes alternative accounts that do not explain contract law by way of
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parties’ moral obligations, but picture the power to contract as a legal analog to
the moral power of promising. Part Four suggests a pluralist theory of contract
law, which recognizes several relationships between contract law and the moral
sphere.
This chapter does not address all of contract law’s possible functions or
justifications. Several scholars have recently emphasized, for example, contract
law’s role in markets, whose social and political functions extend beyond
individual morality.2 Those aspects of contract law lie beyond this chapter’s
scope.
1

Basic Concepts

Contract, promise and agreement are contested concepts. One finds in
the literature various conceptions of each, and a theorist’s conception typically
reflects her substantive commitments. This Part identifies the conceptions I
employ and compares them to others one finds in the literature.
1.1

Contracts

This chapter employs a catholic, nondoctrinal conception of contract. A
contract, as I will use the term, is a collection of legally enforceable voluntary,
chosen obligations between two or more persons acting in their private
capacities.3 Contractual obligations are voluntary in the sense that they are
acquired by voluntary acts, such as entering into an exchange agreement or
signing a formal document. They are chosen in the sense that the parties’
choices determine, at least in part, the content of the obligation.4 Most tort
duties are neither voluntary nor chosen. The legal obligations that traditionally
attach to marriage are voluntary but not chosen. Contractual obligations are
both.
The fact that contractual obligations are chosen is connected to their
content independence. If A has a contractual obligation to x, it is not because
the law deems A’s doing x worthy, but because the law deems A’s choice to
commit herself to xing to be a reason that A should have a legal obligation to x.
The content of the legal obligation—A’s duty to x—is not the reason for the
obligation. This does not mean that A can contract for anything under the sun. A
contract for murder will not be enforced. Nor does it mean that social values
play no role in determining the content of A’s contractual obligations. Contracts
2

See Roy Kreitner, Voicing the Market: Extending the Ambition of Contract
Theory, 69 U. TORONTO L.J. 295 (2019).
3
More precise would be to substitute in the above sentence “jural relations” for
“obligations,” as contracts can also generate privileges, powers, immunities and
so forth. I focus on duties for the sake of simplicity.
4
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often include mandatory terms, such as minimum wages or the implied
warranty of habitability. Default terms and altering rules can be crafted in light
of social interests and made sticky.5 And in resolving ambiguities, a court might
prefer an interpretation that is consistent with public policy. The point is simply
that the act of contracting can transform a legally neutral act into a legally
required one.
In Anglo-American Law one can enter into a contract in any of several
ways. Most common today is the informal contract, which is generated by an
exchange agreement, or an agreement “for consideration.”6 To enter into an
informal contract, parties must agree to a quid pro quo involving one or both’s
future acts or obligations. There are no formal requirements. Thus the
agreement might be express or implied, and if express, oral or written.
In jurisdictions that still recognize the seal, one can also enter into a
contract by undertaking a commitment in a signed and sealed writing delivered
to the obligee. Unlike informal contracts, these formal contracts require neither
consideration nor acceptance.7 Compliance with the formal requirements
suffices.
The catholic conception of contract also captures duties generated by
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which provides that a person acquires a
legal obligation by making a commitment on which the promisee foreseeably
and detrimentally relies, if nonenforcement of the commitment would be
unjust.8 Promissory estoppel is today commonly thought of as an alternative to
liability in contract. But when Williston introduced the idea, he treated reliance
as a substitute for consideration, resulting in a contract like any other.9 And
coming from a very different perspective, Grant Gilmore argued that promissory
5

See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1598–1600 (1999); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of
Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1738–53,
1755–58 (1997). Because impeding altering rules can provide gradations of
stickiness, there is in fact a range of possibilities between chosen and
nonchosen obligations. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory
of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2084–2113 (2012). Fiduciary obligations, for
example, lie somewhere between entirely chosen and entirely mandatory. See
Gregory Klass, What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?, in
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 93 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2017).
6
The exchange conception of consideration is today the dominant one. For an
argument for an alternative, see Jed Lewinsohn, Paid on Both Sides: Quid Pro
Quo Exchange and the Doctrine of Consideration, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2020).
7
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT §§ 95, 104 (1981).
8
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 90(1) (1981).
9
See Samuel Williston, 2 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, at 307–14 (1920)
(“Estoppel as a substitute for consideration.”).
3

Promise, Agreement, Contract
estoppel “has, in effect, swallowed up the bargain principle.”10 The catholic
conception of contract is designed to accommodate such claims.
Common law jurisdictions differ on whether the existence of an
informal contract depends on the parties’ intent to be legally bound.11 The
black-letter law in England and elsewhere in the Commonwealth requires that
parties intend to contract. “For a contract to come into existence, there must be
. . . an intention to create legal relations.”12 In the United States, the Second
Restatement states that “[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be
legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of
intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the
formation of a contract.”13 The American rule admits of exceptions. A U.S. court
might look to the parties’ intent to contract in cases involving, for example,
preliminary agreements, interfamily agreements, and reporters’ promises of
confidentiality.
It is an interesting question whether this difference in black-letter rules
makes a difference in practice. Several scholars have argued that courts apply
the English rule as cover for policy judgments. When the court finds
enforcement of the agreement unproblematic, it does not inquire into the
parties’ contractual intent; when it wishes to deny enforcement, it finds the
parties contractual intent lacking.14 Others have argued that in the United
States, the consideration requirement serves as a proxy test for the parties’
intent to contract, so U.S. law too is designed to sort for a contractual intent.15
As is not uncommon, scholars’ interpretations of the rule and its application
often correlate with their broader views on contract law’s function and
justification. The above conception of contract accommodates both the
American and English rules for contractual intent.

10

Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (Columbus: Ohio State U. Press
1974).
11
See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 1437 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1443–53, 1475–79
(2009).
12
Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274, [59]
(Eng.).
13
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 21 (1981).
14
See P.S. Atiyah, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 153 (5th ed. 1995)
(arguing that the English rule’s presumption of intent to contract means that in
most cases it is “more realistic to say that no positive intention to enter into
legal relations needs to be shown.”); Stephen Hedley, Keeping Contract in Its
Place—Balfour v. Balfour and the Enforceability of Informal Agreements, 5
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1985); Mary Keyes & Kylie Burns, Contract and the
Family: Whither Intention?, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 577 (2002).
15
Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941);
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 313
(1986).
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The relevance vel non of the parties’ legal intent is clearer when it
comes to formal contracts and promissory estoppel. Employing a formality like
the seal is just an expression of the sealer’s intent that the document be legally
effective. The rules for formal contracts therefore sort for parties’ contractual
intent. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, in distinction, with its emphasis on
reliance and the demands of justice, appears not to require that the promisor
intend to acquire a legal commitment.16 Thus in Cohen v. Cowles Media, the
Minnesota Supreme Court could hold both that a reporters’ confidentiality
promise did not create a contract because it was not made with an intent to be
legally bound, and that the source might nonetheless bring a claim of
promissory estoppel.17
1.2

Promises

This chapter employs a relatively narrow conception of promises: a
promise to x is the expression of an intention to acquire a moral obligation to x
by that very expression.18 This definition does not address several important
theoretical questions, such as whether a successful promisor must actually
intend to acquire a promissory obligation (one can express an intention without
having it) or whether one can promise by accident (one can express something
unintentionally). Nor does it take a position on whether promissory obligations
16

It is difficult to say anything substantive about promissory estoppel without
someone pushing back against it. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker,
Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and
Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 496 (1987) (“In most cases in which
liability is imposed only on the basis of promissory estoppel, liability can be
understood as contractual in the broad sense that the promisor apparently
intended to assume a legal obligation under an objective standard.”), with
Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on
Illusory Promises, 44 SW. L.J. 841, 901 (1990) (“[T]he argument that promissory
estoppel is consensual fails because it ignores the express basis on which
innumerable promissory estoppel decisions have proceeded, and because the
consent-based theory of promissory liability it presupposes cannot account for
the courts’ tendency to enforce illusory promises.”).
17
457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), reversed on other grounds, 501 U.S. 663
(1991). But see Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 378 F.3d 698, 705 (7th
Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he essence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is
not that the plaintiff have reasonably relied on the defendant’s promise, but
that he have reasonably relied on its being a promise in the sense of a legal
commitment, and not a mere prediction or aspiration or bit of puffery.”).
18
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, IN LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 218 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) (“To
promise is . . . to communicate an intention to undertake by the very act of
communication an obligation to perform a certain action.”).
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presuppose a social convention of promising.19 On the above conception, not all
promises involve the use of the words “I promise.” But a promise can always be
translated into a sentence of the form, “I promise to x.” Successful promises in
this sense are the exercise of a moral normative power: The expression of an
intention to effect a normative change suffices to do so.
Some theorists employ broader conceptions of promising. Seana
Shiffrin, for example, uses “promise” to refer generally to the voluntary
commitments we make to others, though she allows that there might be
differences in strength between express promises and others.20 Thomas Scanlon
suggests that a promise to x is, roughly, the expression of a firm intention to x,
where the promisee seeks such assurance and the promisor intends to provide
it.21 A theorist’s conception of what a promise is often tracks her substantive
commitments about why promises are binding. Thus, some theorists might deny
that a promise in the above narrow sense, without more, generates a moral
obligation.
There are a few more things to say about about promises. To be
binding, the promisee must accept, or at least not reject, it.22 And a completed
promise gives the promisee a new normative power: the power to release the
promisor from her obligation.23 Promises therefore involve three normative
19

See, e.g., Niko Kolodny & R.J. Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119 (2003).
20
“[A] promise is a voluntary commitment to perform (or to omit) an action that
the promisor has the authority to perform, a commitment qualified (sometimes
explicitly) by apt conditions of performance, that works by transferring some
form of the promisor’s right to decide whether or not to perform that action to
the promisee.” Seana Vallentine Shiffrin, Is a Contract a Promise?, in THE
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 241, 243–44 (Andrei Marmor ed.,
2012). See also James Penner, Promises, Agreements, and Contracts, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 116, 117-18 (G. Klass, et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (defining “promise” as “a voluntarily undertaken
obligation which is unilateral in character”).
21
Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFF. 199, 207
(1990); T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT: NEW
ESSAYS 86, 103 (P. Benson ed., 2001). See also Neil MacCormick, Voluntary
Obligations and Normative Powers—I, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 59, 62 (Supp.
1972) (describing a promise as “an utterance of the speaker’s about his own
future conduct which is essentially characterized by the speaker’s intending his
addressee to take it as being intended to induce the addressee to rely upon the
speaker’s taking the action in question”); P.S. Atiyah, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW
184 (1981) (describing a promise as an admission of the existence of prior
obligations that “can arise without any intention of assuming an obligation,
without any consent or express promise”).
22
David Owens, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 146 (2012).
23
Id.
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powers: the promisor’s power to promise, the promisee’s power to accept or to
reject, and the promisee’s power to release. Finally, like contracts, the
obligation generated by the promise is content-independent. If a promise to x
creates a moral obligation to x, it is not because doing x is morally worthy, but
because of the promise to x. A promise can transform a morally neutral act into
a morally required one. It is this last feature of promises that Hume
characterized as “one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations
that can possibly be imagined, [which] may even be compared
to transubstantiation, or holy orders, where a certain form of words, along with
a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even
of a human nature.”24
1.3

Agreements

A practical agreement is an agreement that one or both parties shall do
something, as distinguished, say, from an agreement that something is the case.
Not all practical agreements involve promises in the above sense. If I agree with
my friend Christian to read and discuss Michael Tomasello’s new book together,
I have not necessarily promised to do so. I have not declared my intention to be
obligated by the very declaration of that intention. We know this is so because if
Christian doubts whether I will follow through, he might ask, “Do you promise?”
J.L. Austin compares the difference between nonpromissory agreements and
promises to that between saying “S is P” and saying “I know S is P.” “But now,
when I say ‘I promise’, a new plunge is taken; I have not merely announced my
intention, but, by using this formula (performing the ritual), I have bound myself
to others, and stake my reputation, in a new way.”25
What are the defining characteristics of nonpromissory practical
agreements? This turns out to be a difficult question. Here it is enough to
observe that such agreements always involve shared intentions: each party has
an intention about what each shall do; those intentions interlock or mesh with
one another; and they refer to one another.26 Shared intentions also involve a
degree of mutual reliance. At a minimum, each person builds the other’s
intentions and probable performance into her own practical reasoning.27 Shared
intentions do not, however, require promises. As Margaret Gilbert observes,
24

David Hume, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 524 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1978) (1739-1740) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
25
J.L. Austin, Other Minds, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 76, 99 (3d ed., 1979).
26
The above is an abbreviated and incomplete description of Michael Bratman’s
analysis of shared intentions. See Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104
ETHICS 97 (1993). See also Margaret Gilbert, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in
SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 14 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2002).
27
Facundo M. Alonso, Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations,
119 ETHICS 444 (2009); Facundo M. Alonso, What is Reliance?, 44 CANADIAN J.
PHIL. 163 (2014).
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two people “need not, in fact, mutually express willingness to be jointly
committed to intend to do A as a body in order to be so committed.”28
Although one can enter into a nonpromissory agreement to x without
declaring one’s intention to acquire a moral obligation to x, one might
nevertheless thereby acquire such an obligation. If I defect from my agreement
with Christian to read and discuss the book with him, I might wrong him, even if
I never promised to read. That obligation might derive from any number of
facts: Christian’s reliance on the agreement, the fact that by agreeing I have
invited him to trust me, a duty of reciprocity, the value of our friendship, or
something else.29 The moral duty to perform a nonpromissory agreement
cannot arise, however, by virtue of a declaration of an intention to undertake
the obligation. There has been no such declaration.
Nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations are in several ways
similar to promissory obligations. The obligations are both voluntary and
chosen. They are content independent: it is the parties’ agreement to x, as
distinguished from the moral value of xing, that generates the obligation. Just as
a promise must be accepted, an agreement is the work of at least two persons
and can therefore be generated by an offer followed by its acceptance. And
each side has the power to release the other from the agreement.
1.4

Voluntary Obligations

Contracts, promises and agreements all generate voluntary obligations.
David Owens distinguishes three senses in which an obligation can be said to be
voluntary.30 An obligation is first grade voluntary if a person’s practical
decision—her decision to do something—is part of how she acquired the
obligation, whether or not she knew or intended her act to have that effect. An
obligation is second grade voluntary if a person’s practical decision put her
under the obligation only because she made it with the knowledge that it would
have that effect. An obligation is third grade voluntary if it arose by virtue of the
obligor’s expression of an intention to, by that expression, acquire the
obligation. A third-grade voluntary obligation results from the exercise of a
normative power. It “is an obligation you undertake rather than incur.”31
Promissory obligations as I have defined them are always third grade
voluntary. They are exercises of a moral normative power. A nonpromissory
agreement-based obligation, in distinction, might be either first or second grade
voluntary. An agreement-based duty always results from a person’s voluntary
28

Gilbert, supra note 26, at 24. See also Margaret Gilbert, Is an Agreement an
Exchange of Promises?, 90 J. PHIL. 628 (1993).
29
See Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695, 701–04 (2012)
(discussing nonpromissory agreement-based obligations).
30
Owens, supra note 22, at 3–6. Owens uses the term “choice dependent”
rather than “voluntary.”
31
Id. at 127.
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act—entering into an agreement—and sometimes also the obligor’s knowledge
that she is acquiring it.
Under the American rule, a contractual obligation might be first, second
or third grade voluntary. If the legal obligation attaches because the parties
have expressed an intent to be legally bound, it is third grade voluntary. This
describes, for example, formal contracts. If, on the contrary, the law makes
room for entry into contracts by accident—say by agreeing to an exchange
unaware of the legal consequences—the resulting legal obligations are only first
grade voluntary. The Second Restatement, for example, suggests that two
parties might orally agree to the sale of a book under the mistaken belief that
their agreement is not enforceable because it is not in writing, yet find
themselves in a contract.32 Finally, one can imagine a rule that conditions
contractual liability on the parties’ apparent knowledge that they are entering
into a legally binding agreement, without requiring that they express an intent
to do so. The resulting contractual obligations would be second grade voluntary.
Here a caveat is perhaps in order. Owens’s categorization of voluntary
obligations turns on the reasons the obligation exists. It might be, for example,
that the vast majority of parties entering into exchange agreements expect the
legal obligations that attach to them. That fact would not entail, however, that
those expectations are part of the law’s reason for attaching the obligations.
Most adults in the United States know that by earning an income they are likely
to incur an obligation to pay employment taxes. That knowledge does not,
however, figure into the law’s reasons for imposing those taxes. The same goes
for contract law. Even if, as a matter of fact, most parties to exchange
agreements expect or intend the legal obligations associated with them, we
need a further argument those expectations or intentions figure into the law’s
reasons for assigning parties those legal obligations.
2

Moral Obligations as Explanations for Contract Law

Having described contracts, promises and nonpromissory agreements, I
now turn to the relationships between them. This Part identifies several ways in
which parties’ moral obligations might figure into the explanations of their
contractual obligations—ways parties’ moral obligations might figure into the
law’s reasons for assigning them contractual obligations. These are ways in
which contract law’s purpose or justification might be connected to the moral
sphere. The next Part discusses theories that do not explain contract law by way
of the parties’ moral obligations, but suggest that contracts are in an important
way similar to promises narrowly understood.
A moral explanatory theory of contract must answer two questions.
What are contracting parties’ moral obligations to one another? And how do
those obligations explain the parties’ legal obligations?

32

Second Restatement § 21 ill. 2.
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2.1

Parties’ Moral Obligations

The Second Restatement defines “contract” as “a promise or a set of
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”33 But its definition of
“promise” is closer to what I am calling “agreement.” “A promise is a
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so
made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been
made.”34 Nor do the conditions of contractual validity—the rules that determine
when a contract comes into existence—require that parties promise
performance. Section 4 of the Second Restatement provides that a “promise
may be stated in words either oral or written, or maybe inferred wholly or partly
from conduct.”35 The comments give the following illustration: “A telephones to
his grocer, ‘Send me a ten-pound bag of flour.’ The grocer sends it. A has
thereby promised to pay the grocer’s current price therefor.”36 In context, A has
agreed to pay for the flour. But it is not obvious that A has expressed his
intention to undertake an obligation (moral or legal) by the very expression of
that intention. If A had failed to pay for groceries in the past, it would be
perfectly intelligible for the grocer to reply, “Do you promise to pay for it?” The
same goes for many express contracts, in which the parties explicitly agree to an
exchange without promising to perform. Thus the Uniform Commercial Code
can eschew talk of promises altogether. It defines “contract” as “the total legal
obligation that results from the parties’ agreement.”37
One might object that the point is merely semantic. I have adopted a
narrow conception of promising. If one uses “promise” to refer to the
acquisition of voluntary obligations generally, as Shiffrin and others do,38 one
might say that contracts involve promises. But the distinction is an important
one.
First, some theorists have identified contract with promise in the
narrow sense. Charles Fried, for example, suggests that “[a]n individual is
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a
convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to
expect the promised performance.”39 This looks very much like the narrow
conception of promises, which fits with Fried’s emphasis on autonomy and
33

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
Id. § 2.
35
Id. § 4.
36
Id. ill. 1.
37
U.C.C. § 1-201(12).
38
See supra note 20.
39
Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16
(1981). See also, id. at 57 (“The moral force behind contract as promise is
autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to
be.”).
34
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freedom of contract. But then one might doubt the premise of his central claim:
that “since a contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because
a promise must be kept.”40 Many contracts do not involve promises in the sense
Fried uses the term.41
Second, recognizing that contracts more often involve agreements than
promises per se answers a possible objection to moral accounts of contract law.
Michael Pratt has observed that one might enter into a contract while
effectively disclaiming a promise to perform.42 This fact is fairly unsurprising.
Because a promise is just an expression of an intent to undertake an obligation
by the very expression of that intent, promissory obligations can always be
avoided in this way. It is not obvious, however, that one can so avoid
nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations. Such obligations might be
more like those that attach to friendship, which cannot be forestalled by simple
disclaimer. (It would be extremely odd to say to someone, “Although I consider
you a friend, I hereby disclaim any moral obligations of amity toward you.”) The
same might go for the nonpromissory moral obligations that attach to
contractual agreements.43
Third, several scholars have sought to reconcile economic analyses of
contract law with promissory theories by emphasizing promisors’ control over
their obligations.44 The argument is that a promisor has the power to specify not
only the content of her first-order moral obligation to perform, but also what
she will owe the promisee if she fails to perform. This radical malleability of
promissory obligations, these theorists argue, renders economic arguments for
the expectation remedy, including the theory of efficient breach, compatible
with promissory theories of contract. If economic analysis shows that
40

Id. at 17.
P.S. Atiyah makes something like this point in his review of Contract as
Promise. “The promises of the parties are legal constructs that cannot be
identified until we have decided what the parties ought to do. Obligation comes
first, promise afterwards.” P.S. Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509, 519
(1981) (reviewing Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION (1981)).
42
Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. L. REV. 801 (2008).
43
This is, in essence, Shiffrin’s response to Pratt, though Shiffrin uses “promise”
in a broader sense than I do. See Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 245–48.
44
Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of
Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Daniel Markovits & Alan
Schwartz, The Myth of Efficiency Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation
Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011). The above skips over important differences
in nuance, but I believe gets at a common mode of argument. For more detailed
assessments of Markovits and Schwartz’s version, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159 (2012);
Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143 (2012).
41
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sophisticated promisors prefer remedies that allow for efficient breach, the
expectation measure can be understood “as the law’s best guess about the
remedial moral duty that most promisors would prefer.”45
I have my doubts about whether promissory obligations are so
malleable. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that though promisors have the
ability to limit the circumstances that excuse their performance, they do not
have the ability to affect the strength of the reason to perform.46
Be that as it may, the above reconciliation strategy is much less
plausible when applied to nonpromissory agreement-based obligations. Just as
it is not obvious that nonpromissory agreement-based obligations can be
avoided by simple disclaimer, it is not obvious that one who incurs such an
obligation has the power to affect its strength or the remedial obligations that
attach to its breach. Jody Kraus has argued that “[i]f personal sovereignty
explains and justifies promissory obligations on the ground that they vindicate
the will of the individuals who incur them, then the remedial moral duties, if
any, that attach to the violation of those obligations should also be subject to
the will of the individuals who create the obligations.”47 It is not obvious that
such autonomy-based arguments apply pari passu to nonpromissory
agreement-based obligations, which are only first or second grade voluntary.
Finally, and more generally: In our everyday moral reasoning, we often
attach a special weight or significance to promissory obligations. To ask for a
promise is to ask for an extra assurance. To promise is to render
nonperformance more wrongful than it otherwise would be. In thinking about
the possible relationship between parties moral and contractual obligations, the
source and character of their moral obligations matter.
2.2

Moral Explanatory Theories

If parties’ contractual obligations are explained, in part or in full, by
their moral obligations, then those moral obligations stem from agreements to
perform that might or might not involve promises. I have not yet argued that
parties always have a moral obligation to perform. Does a consumer who is
legally bound to click-wrap adhesive terms, which it would have been irrational
for her to read and which she predictably ignored, have a moral obligation to
abide by those terms?48 If a residential mortgage is securitized and then
purchased by an institutional investor in a bet on the housing market, does the
homeowner have a moral obligation to pay it back, even if it is in the
45

Kraus, supra note 44, at 1635.
Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 58, 64–65 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2014).
47
Kraus, supra note 44, at 1629–30.
48
See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99
IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014).
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homeowner’s financial interest to default?49 What about an agreement
between two corporations, each of whose officers understand her and her
counterpart’s primary duty to be to maximize shareholder returns?50
This chapter does not seek to answer such questions. Instead, this Part
assumes arguendo that at least some contracting parties have a moral
obligation to perform in order to ask how such obligations might figure into the
explanatory reasons for the associated legal obligations. The next Part discusses
several theories that make no such assumptions about parties’ moral
obligations.
Parties’ moral obligations might figure into the explanation of their
contractual ones in any of four ways: contract law might be designed enforce
the first-order moral obligation to perform; it might enforce, or empower
parties to enforce,51 second-order remedial duties generated by the breach of
their first-order obligations; it might seek to provide support to the social moral
practice of making and keeping agreements; or it might be structured at least to
avoid interfering with parties’ moral lives or doing harm to the moral practice.52
The first two types of explanation posit that contract law enforces parties’ moral
obligations, first- or second-order. The second two focus on the law’s effects on
moral culture and agency.
Least plausible is the claim that contract law is designed only to enforce
parties’ first-order moral obligations to perform. Liam Murphy identifies the two
reasons for doubt.53 First, contract remedies seem designed not to punish or
deter breach, but to compensate the nonbreaching party for harms caused by
breach. Murphy argues that if the goal were to enforce performance, the
presumptive remedy would be at least specific performance. My own view is
49

See Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths about
Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2011); Tess Wilkinson Ryan,
Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic
Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011).
50
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003) (suggesting that artificial persons are
subject only to the morality required by positive law).
51
The possible application of recourse theories to the law of contracts deserves
more than the above nod but would require a significant detour. See John
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010)
(describing the civil recourse theory); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A
Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011) (seeking
to marry civil recourse theory with a consent theory).
52
For variations on this list, see Liam Murphy The Practice of Promise and
Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 151 (G. Klass et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2014); Klass, supra note 29, at 707–09.
53
Murphy, supra note 52, at 156–58. Although Murphy focuses on Fried’s
promise theory, his points apply equally to the idea that contract law might
enforce nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations.
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that not even specific performance would be enough. Specific performance
does not enforce the duty to perform, as it does not ensure that the
nonbreaching party gets what she bargained for: the other side’s willing
performance. Specific performance provides instead only a judicially mandated
substitute for performance, secured through litigation. A contract law designed
to enforce the moral obligation to perform would include punitive damages,
disgorgement or other deterrence based remedies.54 Either way, however, the
general point remains: remedies for breach do not appear to enforce
performance obligations.
Second, enforcing the moral duty to perform violates the liberal
commitment to maintaining the distinction between the right and the good.
“For Millian liberals, who reject coercion merely for the sake of improving a
person’s own welfare, or enforcing their obligations, or making them more
virtuous, the moralist view of contract law does not get off the ground.”55
Performance duties are not the sort of moral obligations a liberal society wants
the law to enforce.
If contract law does not aim to enforce a first-order moral obligation to
perform, it might seek to enforce second-order moral obligations generated by
nonperformance. Theories of corrective justice come in many varieties, some
more convincing than others.56 My own view is that a plausible account for a
theory of contract law starts from Joseph Raz’s “conformity principle,” which
John Gardner restates as follows:
When we have a primary obligation to  at t1, but do not to  at t1, we
acquire, all else being equal, a secondary obligation to come as close as
we now can to ing at t1, where closeness is determined by the reasons
for the original obligation. This may involve nearly ing at t2, or

54

Although several theorists have recommended disgorgement for certain
forms of breach, and the idea made it into the Third Restatement of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment, U.S. courts have not followed suit. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2010); Andrew Kull,
Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1994)
(advocating disgorgement for some breaches); Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 261–82 (2004) (examining the moral complexities of
disgorgement for breach); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOYOLA L. REV.
131, 134 (2008) (arguing that section 39 has little support in U.S. caselaw).
55
Id. at 157.
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For discussions the application of corrective justice theories to contract law,
see Murphy, id. at 158–62; Curtis Bridgeman, Note: Corrective Justice in
Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237
(2003).
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precisely ing at t3, or (eventually) doing something at t27 that has
something in common with ing.57
In short, “the secondary obligation is a rational echo of the primary obligation,
for it exists to serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for the primary
obligation that was not performed when its performance was due.”58 If the
reasons for a party’s first-order moral obligation to perform a contractual
agreement include, for example, an uncompensated benefit conferred on her by
the other party or the other party’s detrimental reliance on the agreement,
those reasons survive nonperformance and arguably generate a second-order
moral duty to compensate.
There is an argument that such remedial moral obligations cannot
explain contract remedies. Contract law enforces executory agreements, which
have not yet been relied on or performed by either side. And recovery often
takes the form of expectation damages, which as Lon Fuller observes, claim to
“’compensate’ the plaintiff by giving him something he never had”—the benefit
of performance.59 These remedial rules might be thought to belie the idea that
contract remedies enforce second-order duties that derive from benefits
received or detrimental reliance. Alternatively, some theorists address this
worry with arguments that contract is better understood instead as the transfer
of an entitlement or the creation of a right to performance.60
My view is that such metaphysical moves are unnecessary.61 As Fuller
observes, one often finds a divergence between the “measure” of damages and
the “motive” for imposing them. Fuller identifies two reasons. First, an area of

57

John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 38 (2011).
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CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 172, 189 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler
eds., Cambridge U. Press 2004).
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L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936).
60
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obligations. David Owens, Does a Promise Transfer a Right, in PHILOSOPHICAL
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law might serve multiple functions or be justified by multiple principles.62 If the
law has “mixed motives,” the remedy might not perfectly match each function
or justification, or even the primary ones. Second, practical considerations such
as difficulties in proof or measurement often recommend an alternative
remedy. “[E]ven where it is reasonable to suppose that a single interest
furnishes the exclusive raison d’être of legal intervention it is still possible for
reasons of convenience and certainty the court may choose a measure of
recovery which differs from that suggested by the interested protected.”63
Remedies for breach might serve to enforce second-order moral obligations
without perfectly tracking the reasons for those obligations.
The above discussion has not yet made a complete case for a corrective
justice theory of contract law. That case would, among other things, need to
explain why if the law does not strictly enforce the first-order moral obligation
to perform, it should enforce the second-order moral obligations that result
from breach. Here Mill’s harm principle might be of some use. Be that as it may,
corrective justice accounts at least perform better on the dimension of fit.
Contract remedies appear designed not so much to punish or deter breach as to
compensate the nonbreaching party for the harms breach causes.
A third variety of moral explanation emphasizes law’s broader social
functions. Several scholars have suggested that contract law is designed not (or
not only) to enforce parties’ moral obligations, but instead (or in addition) to
support the social practice of entering into and keeping morally binding
agreements. Raz, for example, argues that Mill’s harm principle casts doubt on
“the legitimacy of the law’s adoption of a general principle of enforcing
voluntary obligations,” but “does not preclude the law from encouraging moral,
cultural or other valid goals.”64 Along the same lines, Shiffrin suggests that
contract law “is not an effort to legalize as much as possible the interpersonal
moral regime of promising, but rather to provide support for the political and
public values associated with promising.”65
The function that these social-effects accounts attribute to contract law
relies on an empirical claim: that by recognizing and enforcing agreement-based
moral obligations, the law strengthens moral culture. The interaction between
moral culture and legal enforcement, however, is complex. Dori Kimel, for
example, has hypothesized that “enforceability casts a thick and allencompassing veil over the motives and the attitudes towards each other . . .
leaving reliance, performance, and other aspects of contractual conduct largely
62

Fuller & Perdue, supra note 59, at 66 (“[I]t is impossible to assume that when
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Id. at 66–67.
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Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (reviewing
P.S. Atiyah, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)).
65
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L.
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devoid of expressive content.”66 Or consider the famous Israeli day-care
experiment in which imposing a late-pickup fine on parents apparently
undermined a social norm of picking children up on time, rather than reenforcing it.67 None of this is to say that legal enforcement cannot be used to
support moral practices. (I am skeptical, for example, of Kimel’s veil hypothesis.)
But the question of when and how it does so cannot be answered in the
abstract, and is likely to be highly context dependent.68
The same goes for a fourth possible moral explanation. Whether or not
contract law supports the social practice of making and keeping agreements, we
should at least want it not to undermine that practice. At a minimum contract
law should, in Shiffrin’s words, “be made compatible with the conditions for
moral agency to flourish.”69
This do-no-harm principle is attractive. But its application again involves
difficult empirical judgments. Shiffrin, for example, argues that by refusing to
order specific performance and declining to award unforeseeable damages,
contract law “fails to use its distinctive powers and modes of expression to mark
the judgment that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a
price.”70 But are we certain about those rules’ expressive content and practical
effects? By awarding the expected value of performance, the law might be
understood to recognize the moral duty to perform while declining to enforce it.
And the foreseeability rule might be read to reflect each party’s obligation, at
the time of formation, to share information about the costs of
nonperformance.71 Claims about the deleterious effects of individual contract
doctrines on moral culture or agency are no less empirical than those
concerning support for those practices, and resist armchair answers for the
same reasons.
66
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Before leaving moral explanatory theories, I want to return to the
various senses in which contractual obligations might be said to be voluntary. I
have argued that contracting parties’ moral obligations are often only first or
second grade voluntary. None of the above theories presupposes that parties’
legal obligations are voluntary in a more demanding sense. They do not
presuppose that contracting is a legal normative power, that the law seeks to
ensure that parties intend the contractual obligations they acquire. None of the
above functions contract law might serve—enforcing the parties’ first- or
second-order moral obligations, supporting the moral practice, or doing no
harm to that practice—assumes parties’ intent to contract, though all are
compatible with parties sometimes or even always intending to be legally
bound. Moral explanatory theories therefore allow that contractual obligations
might be first, second or third grade voluntary.
3

Separate Spheres and the Similarity of Promise and Contract

Several theoretical approaches reject the idea that the parties’
contractual obligations are explained by their moral ones, but view contracting
as something like the legal analog of promising. Entering into a contract,
according to these theories, is the exercise of a legal normative power, in the
same way making a promise is the exercise of a moral normative one. I begin
with two arguments that entering into a contract is always the exercise of a
normative power—that contract law is, or should be, designed to sort for the
parties’ intent to be legally bound. I then consider the more modest claim that
contracting is sometimes the exercise of a normative power—that the parties’
apparent intent to be legally bound might be a sufficient reason for
enforcement without being a necessary one.
3.1

Contract Law as Pure Power-Conferring Rule

Randy Barnett advances a strong version of the claim that contracting is
a normative power. Rather than looking to the moral sphere, Barnett seeks to
ground contract law a neo-Lockean theory of legal entitlements.72 That theory
begins with a commitment to promoting individuals’ ability to pursue and
achieve happiness, peace, and prosperity. In a world of scarce resources, those
individual pursuits can come into conflict. Legal entitlements mediate such
conflicts. “A theory of entitlements specifies the rights that individuals possess
72

A detailed version of the theory can be found in Randy E. Barnett, THE
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or may possess; it tells us what may be owned and who owns it; it circumscribes
the individual boundaries of human freedom.”73 The commitment to individual
choice further recommends permitting persons to transfer their legal
entitlements when they wish—for example, by entering into a contract that
gives the other side a legal entitlement to one’s future performance.
Barnett’s autonomy theory understands entering into a contract as the
exercise of a legal power.
In a system of entitlements where manifested rights transfers are what
justify the legal enforcement of agreements, any such manifestation
necessarily implies that one intends to be “legally bound,” to adhere to
one’s commitment. Therefore, the phrase “a manifestation of an
intention to be legally bound” neatly captures what a court should seek
to find before holding that a contractual obligation has been created.74
Barnett’s consent theory recommends the English rule: contract liability should
attach when and only when the parties intend that their agreement be
enforceable. In U.S. jurisdictions, where that rule is not part of the black-letter
law, other doctrines and tacit judicial judgments can in practice sort for the
parties intent to contract.75 Although Barnett does not put it this way, contract
emerges as the legal analog to promise. Just as promising gives individuals the
power to undertake new moral obligations when they wish, so contract law
gives parties the power to undertake new legal ones.
Economic analyses of contract law start from a very different place, but
commonly arrive at a similar picture of contracting. Economic theorists typically
model contractual exchanges as transactions between self-interested rational
utility maximizers. Most further assume that parties are insensitive to any moral
obligations that attached to their exchange agreements, but highly attuned to
the legal consequences of nonperformance.76 Rational choice theory and
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microeconomic analysis are then applied to determine the incentive effects of
various legal rules. Early economic analyses of contract law focused on the legal
incentives to perform, arguing that in the model, expectation damages
incentivize performance when and only when performance is efficient.77 Later
analyses paid more attention to the legal incentives on both parties across the
life of the transaction—from investing in the possible deal before formation to
post-breach behavior.78
Practitioners of economic analysis have not paid much attention to
whether the law should condition enforcement on parties’ contractual intent.
The reason might be that economic theories of law are more common in the
United States, where the doctrinal question is not especially salient. Or it might
be because the answer is so obvious given the approach’s methodological
commitments, which suggest at least three reasons to think that the law does or
should condition contractual liability on the parties’ intent to contract.
First, the assumption that parties are highly attuned to legal
consequences entails that parties know when they are entering into a legally
binding contract. To the extent that parties are able avoid legal liability when
they wish—by specifying that their agreement shall not be legally enforceable—
the model suggests that parties who do not opt-out of enforcement must want
it.79
Second, in the model parties often want legal enforcement. The
assumptions of party self-interest and insensitivity to moral obligations entail
that, absent legal enforcement, parties might not trust in one another’s future
performance.80 Reputation and repeat play sometimes suffice. But in the model,
there is often a Hobbesian problem: “he that performeth first has no assurance
that the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to
brindle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of
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some coercive power.”81 Legal enforcement solves this mistrust problem by
both deterring many breaches and insuring the nonbreaching party against
those that occur. Because parties stand to benefit from value-creating
exchanges, both therefore often want legal enforcement of their exchange
agreements.
Third, many economic theorists incorporate into their analyses a further
assumption: that parties know what is in their individual self-interest better
than do lawmakers or courts. That premise suggests giving parties the power to
determine when and how their agreements should be enforced. Lisa Bernstein,
for example, writes that “[i]n structuring their contracting relationship,
transactors allocate aspects of their relationship between the legal and
extralegal realms in ways that seek to maximize the value of their transaction.”82
The rules of contract interpretation and enforcement, in turn, should be
structured to maximize parties’ ability to choose the legal obligations they
wish.83
This point brings us full-circle back to autonomy theories. Charles Fried
has recently observed a convergence between autonomy theories and
economic analysis, which he attributes to their shared commitment to the
proposition that “the law should be designed to allow people in voluntary
relationship to structure their relationship in the way that they judge will best
serve their interests over the long run, at least insofar as they may be deemed
the best judges of their own interests.”84The upshot is that, like Barnett’s
autonomy theory, economic analyses picture contract as legal normative power.
Contractual obligations are third grade voluntary—not incurred, but
undertaken.
Neither autonomy nor economic theories ground parties’ contractual
obligations in their moral ones. Neither treat contracts as promises. But both
understand contracts as similar to promises. Entering into a contract is the
intentional undertaking of a new legal obligation, just as promising is the
intentional undertaking of a moral one. Contracting is the exercise of a legal
normative power in the same way promising is the exercise of a moral
normative power.
81
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3.2

Contract Law as a Partial Power-Conferring Rule

Both Barnett’s consent theory and economic models suggest that the
parties’ intent to be legally bound should, to the extent practicable, be a
necessary condition of contractual liability. One need not be committed to
either theory, however, to recognize that giving parties the legal power to
undertake contractual obligations when they wish expands their autonomy, and
that this is a good thing. No matter how common Hobbes’s mistrust problem,
there is no doubt that contract law sometimes allows parties to enter into joint
projects that would otherwise fail for a lack of trust. As Hanoch Dagan and
Michael Heller observe, contract law “empowers individuals . . . to make
agreements that facilitate their ability legitimately to enlist one another in
pursuing private goals and purposes—and thus contract law enhances our
ability to be the authors of our own lives.”85 Contract law does this by giving
parties the ability to undertake new legal obligations when they wish.
Such an autonomy-enhancing function of contract law presumes that
parties sometimes intend legal liability and that this is a sufficient reason to
provide it. It does not, however, presuppose that parties always intend to
contract—that evidence of the parties’ intent to contract should be a necessary
condition of contractual liability. In short, the positive freedom to enter a
contract when one wishes does not presuppose a negative freedom from
unintended contracts.
4

The Plural Functions of Contract Law

All of the theories discussed in this article are broadly speaking
interpretive ones. Each seeks to identify the functions and justifications that
best explain the law of contract we find in the world around us. One group
locates the explanation in the parties’ agreement-based moral obligations.
Contract law might function to enforce parties’ first-order moral obligations to
perform, to enforce the second-order remedial obligations that attach to
breach, to support the moral practice and culture of making and keeping
agreements, or to at least do no harm to that practice and culture. Another
group explains the law of contract without recourse to the parties’ moral
obligations, but pictures contract as the legal analog to promise. Rather than
pointing to parties’ moral obligations, these theories emphasize ways that
contract law expands individual autonomy and adds to welfare. Although they
do not posit an explanatory connection between contract and the moral sphere,
they tend to view contract as a legal normative power that is very much like the
moral normative power of promising.
There is a strong tendency among contract theorists to adopt one or
another of the above two approaches—one or the other of these pictures of
contract. But there is no inconsistency between them. Contract law might
85
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function to enforce parties’ agreement-based moral obligations and support
moral culture generally and at the same time, by enabling parties to
intentionally enter into legally binding agreements, serve to extend their ability
to engage in joint projects.
In previous work I have called this the “compound theory” of contract.86
Whereas most laws can be classified as either duty-imposing or powerconferring, contract law appears to be both at once. It both imposes on parties
to exchange agreements a legal obligation to perform for reasons independent
of the parties’ probable contractual intent, and confers on them the power to
undertake that legal obligation when they so intend because they so intend. The
law is structured to make room for contractual obligations that are first grade
voluntary and at the same time recognizes and enables third grade voluntary
contractual obligations.
The compound theory is a form of pluralism: it understands contract law
as a multi-purpose tool.87 But it is a structured pluralism. The individual
functions contract law serves give it a distinctive dual structure. Contract law
both imposes duties on parties to exchange agreements and gives those parties
the power to undertake new legal obligations and restructure their existing
ones. I have argued elsewhere that the compound theory provides the best
interpretation of the rules of contract formation and construction we find in the
world around us, especially those that govern formation. Here I merely note
that a compound theory also accounts for an aspect of contract law that simple
theories tend to obscure.
Whereas simple moral theories tend to view contract law as responding
to parties’ exogenously given moral obligations, a compound theory suggests
that the law might also serve to identify and structure them. The point here is
akin to Hart’s observation that the law seeks not only to deter the Holmesian
bad man (an idea that reappears in economic accounts), but also to give
guidance to the puzzled one.88 Lawmakers can and do set defaults and
mandatory rules to take account of shared social understandings of what parties
owe one another. These can range from the morally thin obligations between,
say, traders in the derivatives market to much thicker obligations, such as those
between employers and employees or landlords and tenants. By the same
token, parties who know they are entering into a legally binding agreement can
look to legal default and mandatory terms for information about not only their
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legal obligations, but also their moral ones. The compound theory explains how
it is that contract law can in this way both respond to and structure parties’
moral relationships. Contractual obligations can be both first- and third-grade
voluntary, and contract law can be one and the same time both a duty-imposing
and a power-conferring rule.
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